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SECTION 2-302 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
IN SALES CONTRACTS
EQUITY has traditionally required that a contract be fair in all its parts
before specific performance will be granted.1 The degree of unconscionability
necessary to bar relief is unclear,2 although an improvident bargain is ordi-
narily no defense. 3 But courts have generally been unwilling to recognize
1. Texas Co. v. Andres, 97 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Idaho 1951); Bowen v. Waters, 3
Fed. Cas. 1058, No. 1725 (S.D.N.Y. 1827); Cowen v. McNealy, 342 Ill. App. 179, 96
N.E.2d 100 (1950) ; POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORIANCE OF CONTRACTS § 40 (3d ed. 1926)
(hereinafter cited as POmiEROY). Specific performance is a discretionary remedy. Pope
Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236 (1892) ; Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445, 505
(N.Y. 1824); DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY §91 (1950). In deciding
whether a contract is fair, courts look to surrounding circumstances as well as to the
contract itself. See Grieson v. Winey, 240 Fed. 691, 692 (8th Cir. 1917) ; Panco v. Rogers,
19 N.J. Super. 12, 18, 87 A.2d 770, 773 (Ch. 1952) ; PoI.%RoY § 183. There is a conflict
of opinion as to whether circumstances subsequent to the actual negotiation will be con-
sidered in determining fairness. Id. § 177. Even courts which profess to look only at
events occurring at the time the contract was made may actually consider subsequent
events by invoking the equitable doctrine that a contract will not be specifically enforced
if it will work a hardship on either party. Id. § 185; Comment, 18 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 146,
149-50 (1950).
2. Since specific performance is discretionary with the court and each case is decided
on its own particular facts, no adequate standards have been established. 1 PAGE, CON-
TRACTs § 641 (2d ed. 1920) (hereinafter cited as PAGE). Specific performance has been
denied on numerous and widely varying grounds. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (specific performance refused because of one unfair clause) ;
Texas Co. v. Andres, 97 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Idaho 1951) (refusal to enforce "option to
buy" clause in lease because defendant did not realize its meaning) ; Grieson v. Winey,
240 Fed. 691 (8th Cir. 1917) (fraud); Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 11 N.W. 265
(1882) (lack of mutuality) ; McElroy v. Maxwell, 101 Mo. 294, 14 S.W. 1 (1890) (con-
cealment of material facts in negotiation). The vague nature of the standard is increased
because there has never been an adequate definition of an "unconscionable contract." The
standard definition was originated by Lord Hardwicke in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750): An unconscionable bargain is one
"such as no man in his senses, and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and
as no honest and fair man would accept on the other. . . ." Similar definitions are nu-
merous. See, e.g., Hall v. Wingate, 159 Ga. 630, 667, 126 S.E. 796, 813 (1924) ; Frank-
lin Fire Insurance Co. v. Noll, 115 Ind. App. 289, 294, 58 N.E.2d 947, 949 (1945). See
PAGE §641. Page and Pomeroy enumerate several characteristics of an unconscionable
bargain. PAGE § 641.; PomERoY § 40.
3. Arentsen v. Sherman Towel Service Corp., 352 Ill. 327, 185 N.E. 822 (1933);
Knott v. Cutler, 224 N.C. 427, 31 S.E.2d 359 (1944). See DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra note
1, § 92. Contra: Stone v. Pratt, 25 Ill. 25 (1860). Several state statutes provide that in-
adequacy of consideration alone is enough to preclude specific performance. See, e-g.,
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3391 (1) (Deering, 1949); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-805 (1936); MONT.
REv. CODE § 17-808(1) (1947); N.D. REy. CODE §32-0413(1) (1943).
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unfairness as a ground for recission and cancellation, 4 or as a defense to an
action for damages.5 However, by finding fraud, lack of mutuality, or ambi-
guity, courts have often refused to award damages on an unconscionable con-
tract.6
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code-, makes unconscionability
a defense s to all actions, legal or equitable, 9 based on sales contracts. But
4. A dichotomy between specific performance and cancellation has long been recog-
nized. See Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264, 275 (U.S. 1831) ; Thompson v. Jackson, 24
Va. 504, 505 (1825). See 5 Cormix, Cox-=a.crs § 1136 (1951). Thus, the courts have
frequently noted that a refusal of specific performance does not automatically entitle the
defendant to cancellation. Hepburn v. Dunlop, 1 Wheat. 179 (U.S. 1316); Panco v.
Rogers, 19 N.J. Super. 12, 87 A.2d 770 (Ch. 1952) ; Newman v. Kay, 57 \W. Va. 98, 49
S.E. 926. See 3 ELLIOTr, CoNTs_%crs § 2411 (1913). When the court refuses brth to en-
force specifically and to cancel, the plaintiff is left to his remedy "at law." See Pope
.Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 236 (1892) ; Van Norsdall v. Smith, 141 Mich. 355,
362, 104 N.W. 660, 662 (1905): Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 179, 45 S.E.2d 875, 881
(1948).
5. 1 CoRnix, CoxmRArs § 128 (1950). Contra: Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 405
(1889) ; Work v. Fidelity Oil & Gas Co., 79 Kan. 118, 98 Pac. 901 (1908).
6. Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 138 Ark. 534, 212 S.V. 313 (1919) (lack
of mutuality) : Hardy v. General 'Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.E.
327 (1928) (vagueness and ambiguity) ; Planters Nat. Bank of Fredericksburg v. -. G.
Heflin Co., 166 Va. 166, 184 S.E. 216 (1936) (constructive fraud). Another method used
by common law courts to ohtain the desired result was through tortured interpretation of
the contract terms. See New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 199 N.V.
815 (1922) : Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927). For a full discus-
sion of the methuds used by courts to avoid unfair contracts, see Notes, 58 YALE L.
1161 (1949) ; 27 CoL- L. REv. 178 (1927).
7. This section is new to the law. It did not appear in the Uniform Sales Act, the
predecessor to Article Two of the present Code. UxiFoRM Co.mEmnCTAL Copc- § 2-302,
Comment (Official Draft 1952) (hereinafter cited as UCC). The Section states: "1)
If the court finds the contract or any clause of the contract to be unconscionable it may
refuse to enforce the contract or may strike any unconscionable clause and enforce the
contract as if the stricken clause had never existed. 2) When it is claimed or appears
to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the court may
afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose
and effect to aid the court in making the determination." UCC § 2-302 (Official Draft,
1952). The section w,-as discussed before its final enactment in 18 U. or Cui. L Riv. 146
(1950).
The Code has been introduced and is now under legislative study in California, Con-
necticut, Illinois, Indiana, 'Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. It has already been enacted in Pennsylvania and
becomes effective there on July 1, 1954. 7 CON.RFExCE ON PERSOVAL FIA:xCE Lw
QUARTERLY REPORT 72-6 (Summer 1953).
8. The section was apparently desiged to apply unly as a defense since the words
"'refuse to enforce" are used. However, it is quite possible that it might be utilized
affirmatively in an action for reformation. Plaintiff in such an action could argue that
the court in reforming the instrument should heed the command of the section and "re-
fuse to enforce7' any unconscionable clauses in their fashioning of the reformed instrument.
Historically, reformation was only decreed to conform an agreement to fit the actual in-
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if only part of a contract is unconscionable, that part may be stricken and
the remainder enforced. The section further provides that whenever "it is
claimed or appears" that the contract is unconscionable, the parties may
"present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect." These
provisions were designed to promote explicit judicial policing of contract
terms 10 without resort to strained interpretations of traditional contract doc-
trines."1
For historical reasons, some courts may have difficulty in adjusting to their
new role 12 under Section 2-302. This difficulty will be particularly acute in
actions on non-separable contracts, since literal application of the section will
require complete denial of relief-in effect, the cancellation of the instrument.18
Courts well-versed in the traditional equity dichotomy between specific per-
formance and cancellation may be reluctant.to cancel the contract even though
unwilling to decree specific performance. 14 As a compromise between full
enforcement and complete denial of relief, these courts may be persuaded
to substitute fair terms for unconscionable ones and enforce the contract as
rewritten.
tent of the parties when this intent had been frustrated by a mistake of fact or law. See
Philippine Sugar Co. v. Philippine Islands, 247 U.S. 385, 389 (1918). However, § 2-302
could be construed to mean that unconscionability shall now become a ground for refor-
mation, in that unconscionability connotes that a substantive error has been made by one
of the parties. Any court seeking buttress for such an argument could find it in the use
of the terms "reformed" and "reformation" in prior drafts of the section. See UCC
§ 2-302, Comment (Tentative Draft, 1949) ; UNIFORM REvISED SALES Acr § 23 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
9. 18 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 146, 150 (1950); cases cited in UCC § 2-302, Comment
(Official Draft, 1952) as motivating the enactment of the section are of both a legal and
equitable nature. The drafters once contemplated rephrasing the words "refuse to en-
force" to avoid the inference that the section is meant to deal only with questions of
specific performance. UCC, REVISIONS To PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT No. 2 (May, 1951).
This proposal was not carried through. Nonetheless, since the drafters did not indicate
otherwise, the section must be presumed to extend to all actions, regardless of the nature
of the relief sought.
10. "This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable." UCC § 2-302,
Comment (Official Draft, 1952).
11. See note 6 supra; UCC § 2-302, Comment (Official Draft, 1952).
12. That the section is new to sales law is not open to doubt. CALIFORNIA ANNOTA-
TIONS TO PROPOSED UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (1952) ; REPORT ON THE PROrOSED
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 18 (New York City Bar Association, 1952) ; PENNSYLVANIA
ANNOTATIONS TO THE PROPOSED UNIFORM CO.tERCIAL CODE 8, 18 (1952) ; 17 ALBANY
L. REV. 11, 22 (1952); Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code-The Effect of Its
Adoption in Tennessee, 22 TENN. L. REv. 776, 793 (1953).
13. The section allows only a refusal to enforce or a striking of unconscionable terms
and the enforcement of the rest of the contract. See note 7 sufpra. Obviously, if the con-
tract is non-separable the "strike and enforce" part of the Section is meaningless. Thus,
the court has only two alternatives when faced with a non-separable contract-enforce-
ment or a refusal to enforce.
14. See cases cited note 4 supra.
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Substitution as a technique is open to grave doubt. In a damage action
it would require assessment of damages based on the substituted clauses.
Thus the defendant would be required to pay damages for breach of a con-
tract which he never had an opportunity to perform. Had the substituted
clauses been available to him from the outset, the defendant might not have
breached the agreement. While this objection does not apply to suits for
specific performance, there are others which do. Substitution, if extended be-
yond price or other equally definite provisions, might lead the court into a
morass of conflicting and often intangible evidence. Thus, formulation of the
precise terms of a fair contract would depend on arbitrary judicial concepts
of fairness.'5 The results of such judicial speculation might be a contract quite
at variance with the intention of either or both of the parties. When enforce-
ment of a contract, either by damages or specific performance, is refused, it
is difficult to see why any substitution should be imposedY' Moreover. to
the extent that the purpose of the section is to deter the drafting of uncon-
scionable contracts, 17 substitution conflicts with it. The punishment imposed
upon the drafter would be far less severe in most situations if substitution
were allowed than if the entire contract were held void.' 8
15. See 18 U. OF Cm. L. REv. 146, 152 (1950).
16. There may be instances in which the defendant has accepted part o r all of tht
plaintiff's performance before realizing the unconscionable nature of the c'jntract and
under circumstances which prevent the return of the goods delivered. In such a situati'n
there is some authority for the proposition that the plaintiff should he cmpLnsated f'_r
the fair value of his performance. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1.29) and ca ,s
therein cited. A fortiori this same doctrine should apply where the defendant has partl
performed but refuses to complete p-rfikrmance upon discovery of the unconscionahility.
Since the defendant may not realize the unconscionabitity until after he has tahen n,,me
action on the contract, the doctrine of "waiver" should have no application under th '
section. Any action that the defendant has taken should go to the question uf whether
the contract was actually unconscionable rather than constituting a waiver of the defese.
The defendant should always be permitted to raise the unconscionability defense, but
should be required to explain away any performance on his part.
17. The purpose of the section may not be to punish those who draft unconscionable
contracts, but rather to mold fair agreements for the parties whenever possible.
18. This same argument has been advanced with reference to the practice of fashion-
ing unreasonable restraint of trade contracts into fair agreements. See Note, 45 ILuy.
L. REv. 751 (1931); Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply 119131 A.C. 724, whreiu
Lord M1oulton said at 745, "It would in my opinion be pessimi exempli if, when an em-
ployer has exacted a covenant deliberately framed in unreasonably wide terms, the Courts
were to come to his assistance and, by applying their ingenuity and knwlcdge of the law,
carve out of this void covenant the maximum of what he might validly have required
... the hardship imposed by the exaction of unreasonable covenants by cmploy.ers would
be greatly increased if they could continue the practice with the expectation that... the
Court would in the end enable them to obtain everything which they could have obtained
by acting reasonably."
Of course, there could be cases in which the plaintiff would prefer complete terminatiun
of contractual relations to a substituted contract. Such situations would perhaps ozcur
most frequently when the court substituted a new price clause. One party might well
prefer "no contract" to a contract with a price neither desired nor contemplated.
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Although there may be rare situations in which substitution is preferable
to termination of the parties' contractual relationship. Section 2-302, as writ-
ten, does not provide for such a solution.IO While substitution might be im-
plied as the counterpart of the power to enforce partially a separable con-
tract,'2 0 a provision permitting substitution, which appeared in an earlier draft
of the section, was expressly eliminated from the final draft." In view of
their traditional reluctance to rewrite contract terms, 22 courts in reading the
section may well invoke the doctrine that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are to be strictly construed.23  On this basis, courts could, with
justification. refuse to read substitution into the section.
The substitution problem is less likely to arise when separable contracts
are in dispute because the section extends the equity doctrine of partial en-
forcement to unconscionable contracts..2 4 While equity courts have not general-
ly enforced only parts of an unconscionable contract, -" ; they have always
recognized the power to enforce partially an illegal contract which is sepa-
19. The section permits only the striking of unconscionable provisions and the en-
forcement of the contract "as if the stricken clause had never existed." UCC § 2-302
(Official Draft, 1952).
20. It could be argued that the power to strike clauses and enforce the remainder
of the contract was meant to apply to both separable and non-separable contracts. If this
is true, substitution is a necessity, since if the contract is non-separable and certain parts
of it are stricken, there would be nothing left to enforce unless provisions were substituted,
21. UCC § 2-302 (Proposed Final Draft, Spring 1950) provided: "If the court finds
the contract or any clause of the contract to be unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce
the contract or strike any clauses and enforce the rest of the contract or substitute for
the stricken clause such provision, as would be implied under this Article if the stricken
clause had never existed." (Italics supplied). This language also appeared in two earlier
drafts. THE CODE OF COMMERCIAL LAW, art. II, part II, § 23 (Tentative Draft, 1948) ;
UCC § 2-302 (Tentative Draft, 1949). In 1950 the substitution part of the section was
stricken without explanation. UCC § 2-302, RavisioN OF ARTTcLE 2, 4, AND ARTICLE 9
(September 1950). However, proponents of substitution might argue that since § 1-102
(3) (g) of the Code provides that "Prior drafts of text and comments may not be used
to ascertain legislative intent" no inference should be drawn from the fact that the drafters
struck this part of the section.
22. See Columbia Gas Construction Co. v. Holbrook, 81 F.2d 417, 419 (6th Cir.
1936) ; Brown v. Manufacturer's Trust Co., 278 N.Y. 317, 324, 16 N.E.2d 350, 352 (1938);
Southern Style Shops, Inc. v. Mann, 157 Tenn. 1, 4, 4 S.W.2d 959 (1928).
23. See Scharfeld v. Richardson, 133 F.2d 340, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; State Bank of
Milan v. Sylte, 162 Minn. 72, 75, 202 N.W. 70, 71 (1925).
24. The section makes it quite clear that the court may either refuse to enforce the
entire agreement or may enforce only the fair parts. See note 7 supra.
25. 3 ELLIOTr, CONTRACTS §2276 (1913); 17 ALBANY L. REv. 11, 22 (1952). A
typical statement is that the contract must be fair in "all its parts" before any part of it
will be enforced. See Soehnlein v. Pumphrey, 183 Md. 334, 337, 37 A.2d 843, 845 (1944) ;
Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 177, 45 S.E.2d 875, 879 (1948). For an example of partial
enforcement of an unconscionable contract see Nevada Nickel Syndicate, Ltd. v. Na-
tional Nickel Co., 96 Fed. 133 (D. Nev. 1899). See also Rabinowitz v. Borish, 43 F.
Supp. 413, 415 (D.N.J. 1942) ; Neely v. Broad Street Nat. Bank of Red Bank, 16 F. Supp.
839, 840 (D.N.J. 1936).
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rable.2 6 Much of the litigation arising under the separability provision of
Section 2-302 will concern form contracts.Y Many of these agreements are
lengthy, couched in language that defies understanding, and printed in t3e
of a size not conducive to careful reading.28 Form contracts generally reflect
complete control of negotiations by the party drafting the instrument and
almost total lack of bargaining power in the other party.- Section 2-302 is
designed to avoid exploitation of such situations by limiting the stronger
party's ability to enforce the terms he dictates. thus forcing him to exercise
restraint in drafting.3'
Defining a separable contract may be a difficult problem in appl3ing Section
2-302. The procrustean rule, that a clause is separable if a blue pencil can be
run through it without rendering the remainder of the contract meaninglessD
26. The doctrine originated in Pigot's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 2bb, 77 ig. Rep. 1177
(1614). See also Osgood v. Bauder, 75 Iowa 550, 39 N.W. 837 (1893); 3 Wmusrox,
SALES §681 (1948); RESiAkTE-MF-T, Co.xrn.crs §§606-07 (1932); Comment, 33 MicH.
L Rav. 278 (1934).
27. Indeed, when the Section was first promulgated as § .3 of the Uniform Revised
Sales Act, the drafters were concerned solely with form contract clauses. Uzvorai R.I.-
viSED SALES Act § 23 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944). Of course, as now written
the section is not restricted to form contracts. It has even been suggested that its effect
may extend beyond the law of sales. 1 CoRBixx, Cox .mwm § 12S n.94 (1951).
28. See Note, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 494 (1950). For judicial recognition of these facts
in the field of insurance law see DeLancey v. Insurance Co., 52 N.H. 581 (1873) where
Judge Doe says at 587: "These provisions [f an insurance contract] were of such bulL
and character that they would not he understood by men in general, even if _utjected to
a careful and laborious study: by men in general, they were sure not to be atudid at
all .... The compound, if read by him would, unless he were an extraordinary man, be
an inexplicable riddle, a mere flood of darkness and confusion . . . it [the contract] was
printed in such small type, and in lines so long and so crowded, that the perusal of it was
made physically difficult, painful and injurious."
29. See Note, 63 HAsw. L. Rav. 494, 503 (1950). See also Note, 58 YVX UJ. 1161
(1949). For a complete discussion of standardized contracts see PRAUtsxrrZ, Tuc ST,%:1w-
ARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CoNTACrS IxN ENGLsI AND CONTUENTAL Lw (1937). See
also, Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Sonw Thoughts About Frccdom of Contract, 43
CoL L Rav. 629 (1943) ; Radin, Contract Obligation and the Human Will, 43 COL. L
REv. 575 (1943) ; Sales, Standard Form Contracts, 16 MoD. L RFy. 318 (1953).
30. If companies utilizing form instruments have them overthrown by the c6urts
they may simply "water down" the objectionable portion and hope that the next time the
clause will be approved. Thus, the complete obliteratiun of undesirable clauses in a par-
ticular contract may not be accomplished in a single law suit.
Despite this expected influence of the section, some courts may still feel that by refus-
ing to enforce one form contract, they are endangering all such agreements and encourag-
ing mass breach against the company utilizing the instrument. Further, where the pro-
duction process of an enterprise is dependent on the performance of their form instruments,
this fear of mass breach becomes even more compelling. See Curtice Brothers v. Catts,
72 NJ. Eq. 831, 66 Atl. 935 (Ch. 1907); Friedburg, Inc. v. McClary, 173 Ky. 579, 191
S.W. 300 (1917) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1161, 1164 (1949).
31. Emler v. Ferne, 23 Ohio App. 218, 221, 155 N.E. 496, 497 (1926).
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is obviously figurative and mechanical. 32 A more realistic approach would be
to determine whether the unenforceable clause goes to the root of the bargain.
The question is not whether the contract, in the abstract, is intelligible, but
whether elimination of the unconscionable clause would so emasculate the
contract that reasonable men, having the objectives of the parties, would not
have drawn such an instrument. 33 While the plaintiff cannot enforce an tin-
conscionable contract, the defendant should not be allowed to ignore the con-
tract when the unconscionable part does not corrupt the whole bargain.,'
32. See Atwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K.B. 571, 578. See 32 ORE. L. REv. 260, 262
(1953).
33. For a similar suggestion see Comment, 33 Micr. L. REv. 278, 284 (1934). Under
the proposed test, if the purpose of the agreement can be effectuated without the unen-
forceable clause, the remainder of the contract should be enforced. But, if the unenforce-
able clause taints the entire agreement, no enforcement should be permitted. See Mason
v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co., [1913] A.C. 724.
A hypothetical case may serve to illustrate the difference between the blue pencil test
and the one here proposed. Suppose that X, a large and powerful oil company, made a
gasoline dealership contract with A. By the terms of the contract, A is to buy his gasoline
only from X, and 80% of the profit of the gasoline station is to go to X. Further, ,d is
to handle only X lubricants, honor X credit cards and maintain his station in conformity
with the company's general plan. In return X is to construct the filling station. If the
clause requiring A to buy all his gasoline from X and return 80% of the profits were
found unconscionable, the "blue pencil test" would logically require its severence and the
enforcement of the rest of the contract. However, if this contract is looked at carefully,
it is clear that this clause is the very heart of the agreement and the rest of the contract,
while intelligible, is of little practical significance. It is quite doubtful whether the con-
tract would have been made without the objectionable clause. Thus, the court should
refuse to enforce the entire bargain and relieve A from the burden of perf6rming the
incidental clauses.
34. Such a policy might have led to a better result in Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,
172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949), noted in 58 YALE L.J. 1161 (1949). In that case Campbell
had entered into a contract with George and Harry Wentz for the delivery of all of a
certain type of carrot to be grown on the Wentz farm during 1947. By the time for
delivery, the price had risen greatly. The Wentzes refused to deliver to Campbell and
instead sold to a neighboring farmer who in turn sold some of the carrots to Campbell
on the open market. Campbell sued to enjoin the further sale of carrots and to compel
specific performance of the contract. The court considered several of the form clauses
and found that they were not unconscionable standing alone. However, the court felt that
one particular clause rendered the entire contract unconscionable. By this clause Camp-
bell was excused from accepting carrots under certain circumstances. If and when such
circumstances arose, the grower was not permitted to sell his carrots anywhere else unless
Campbell agreed. The court expressly rejected the argument that this clause be separated
from the rest of the contract saying, "The plaintiff argues that the provisions of the con-
tract are separable. We agree that they are, but do not think that decisions separating
out certain provisions from illegal contracts are in point here . . . all we say is that the
sum total of its provisions drives too hard a bargain for a court of conscience to assist."
Id. at 84. Under § 2-302, severability is expressly permitted and had the contract been
severed in the Campbell case, neither party could have complained. While Campbell should
not be permitted to enforce such a clause, the defendant should not be excused from per-
formance when he is obviously in wilful breach of the main part of the agreement.
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It has been argued that Section 2-302 may permit spurious use of the un-
conscionabilitv defense to obtain settlements in cases of wrongful breach.3 -:
Application of the section will require considerable judicial knowledge of
business practices, commercial negotiations, and market conditions.30i Litiga-
tion involving the complex evidence necessary to such knowledge may be
lengthy, expensive, and uncertain, especially when directed to an issue so ill-
defined as unconscionability. Thus, the threat of invoking the section may
be used. when a contract containing some questionable clauses has been
breached, to bludgeon settlements from plaintiffs with valid claims.
The validity of this argument is. in part, dependent on who must bear the
burden of proof under the section. If the plaintiff is required to disprove
unconscionability. the position of captious defendants may indeed be strength-
ened. Unconscionability should, therefore, be viewed as an affirmative de-
fense.3 7 If defendant fails to make out a prima facie case, as might well be
true in a "holdup" defense, a directed verdict for plaintiff would presumably
follow. If defendant succeeds in making out a case, there is no reason why
the plaintiff should not be required to rebut it. Prospective defendants, know-
ing that they must substantiate their charges, may be more hesitant about
invoking the section to coerce setflenent.
Aside from the burden of proof, the argument that Section 2-302 will in-
crease coerced settlements is of doubtful validity. The vagueness of the sec-
tion presents no new problem to this area of the law. The term "unconscion-
ability" has long been in use in equity 38 and equally vague concepts have
frequently plagued litigants at law.39 Moreover, the section opens no evi-
dentiary flood-gates since courts have traditionally permitted wide latitude in
the introduction of evidence when the fairness of a contract is challenged.4
35. See 18 U. oF CHI. L REv. 146, 152 (1950).
36. Ibid.
37. The Section makes no reference, either in text or comment, to the burden of
proof. However, under a Montana statute, similar to § 2-302 insofar as specific perform-
ance is concerned, it has been held that the burden of proof is on he who asserts any of
the various defenses. Mo.Nr. REv. CoDe § 17-80S (1947), In re Grogan's Estate, 38 Mont.
540, 100 Pac. 1044 (1909); Finlen v. Heinze, 28 Mont. 548, 73 Pac. 123 (1903). Of
course, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the contract is fair on its face, but
once he has established this, it is the defendant's job to prove that the cuntract is unfair
by reason of extrinsic facts. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Illinois Merchants' Trust Co.,
329 IlL 334, 160 N.E. 597 (1928) ; Indianapolis Northern Traction Co. v. Essington, 54
Ind. App. 286, 100 N.E. 765 (1913) ; Parsons v. Lipe, 158 Misc. 32, U60 X.Y. Supp. 60
(Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd sub nom. Parsons v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 243 App. Div.
681, 277 N.Y. Supp. 426 (4th Dep't 1935), off'd, 269 N.Y. 630, 200 N.E. 31 (1936).
38. See note 1 supra.
39. See note 6 supra. See also Llewellyn, Rczieew of Prausnit:, The Slandardicalion
of Comnercial Contracts in English and Continental Lau, 52 H.xv. L Rm. 700, 702
(1939).
40. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Andres, 97 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Idaho 1951)'; Fisk v. Fisk,
328 Mich. 570, 44 NAV2d 184 (1950). See Denson v. Mapes, 71 F. Supp. 503, 503 (D.
Nev. 1947), aff'd, 166 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1948).
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Section 2-302 simply accepts this principle ;41 it does not give unscrupulous
defendants a more powerful weapon than they already possess.
By its vagueness the section does, however, pose a serious problem for the
businessman, since the term "unconscionability" gives little guidance to the
enforceability of a contract. This difficulty is increased by the obvious lack
of judicial interpretation of the section. The framers apparently intended that
traditional equity notions of fairness, developed in cases of specific perform-
ance, should control.4 2 Courts should look to these decisions for a guide in
determining enforceability. Similarly, the drafter of contracts, who is con-
cerned lest he run afoul of the section, should look to specific performance
cases as the best available guide to the enforceability of his contract terms.
40
Despite the possible difficulties which Section 2-302 may initially cause and
the slight danger of increased "holdup" defenses, the protection which it will
afford to parties with little bargaining power makes its enactment desirable.
44
Traditional legal doctrines of fraud, mutuality, and ambiguity do not properly
achieve this objective. Their us in negating contracts creates no standards
by which the fairness of future contracts may be judged, and their failure
to meet squarely the issue of fairness encourages defeated drafters to persist
41. "Sub-section (2) makes it clear that it is proper for the court to hear evidence
upon these questions." UCC § 2-302, Comment (Official Draft, 1952).
42. This is the only logical inference since the unconscionability concept was of use
almost exclusively in actions for specific performance. See note 1 supra. See also UCC
§2-302, Comment (Tentative Draft, 1949) wherein the drafters stated that the section
was intended to "apply to the Field of Sales the equity courts' ancient policy of policing
contracts for unconscionability or unreasonableness."
43. Of course these cases vary widely depending on the particular facts of each. See
note 2 supra. Certain broad requirements have been enunciated such as: there may be no
sharp and unscrupulous practices, no overreaching and no concealment of material facts.
PomEaoY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 40. The following cases illustrate some clauses which
have been held unenforceable either by equity courts using the unconscionability doctrine
or courts of law using one of the other concepts. Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406
(1889) (clause which set price forty times higher than current market price) ; Texas Co.
v. Andres, 97 F. Supp. 454 (D. Idaho 1951) (an option to purchase clause where its im-
port was not fully disclosed to the lessor); Weil v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 138
Ark. 534, 212 S.W. 313 (1919) (contract exempting seller from liability for any "loss of
profit or damages from its failure to deliver goods ordered or for cancellation of this
agreement."); New Prague Flouring Mill Co. v. Spears, 194 Iowa 417, 189 N.W. 815
(1922) (clause permitting seller to extend shipping date when such clause was wrongfully
used by seller to increase damages based on rising market price after the buyer had clearly
breached) ; Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118,
(1.922) (clause providing that there were no warranties, express or implied, unless speci-
fically set out in the agreement) ; Austin Co. v. Tillman Co., 104 Ore. 541, 209 Pac. 131
(1922) (clause limiting buyer's right to return goods held applicable only if seller had
delivered goods which reasonably met the contract description). See also PAGE, op. cit.
supra note 2, § 641.
44. Section 2-302 was enacted as a part of the Code in Pennsylvania. § 2-302 Act No.
1, Pennsylvania General Assembly, (1953).
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NOTES
in imposing unfair terms. 45 Moreover, extension of these doctrines to deal
with an unconscionable contract establishes embarrassing precedents for their
normal application.4 1 Section 2-302 eliminates these difficulties. Courts, in
applying the section to unconscionable and non-separable contracts, should
deny relief even though this is tantamount to cancellation. But when the un-
conscionable clause arises in a separable contract and does not invalidate the
entire agreement, only that clause should be stricken. If applied in this man-
ner, the section will be a significant contribution to sales law, and, even more
important. to the whole area of contract law.
4 7
45. See, Clark. J., concurring in Gaunt v. John Hancock Mfut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F2d
599, 603 (2d Cir. 1947).
46. See Llewellyn, Rezi, of Pransnitz, The Standardization of Con:nzcreial Col-
tracts in English and Continental Laze, 52 T-.v. L. REv. 700, 703 (1939). For an argu-
ment that the legal doctrines should be extended making the enactment of § 2-302 un-
necessary see 18 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 146, 152 (1950).
47. Section 2-302 "takes an important step in closing the cultural lag between lego-
political theory of the role of c6ntract and the inflexibility of mass transactions conducted
through linitedly authorized personnel in the hierarchies of commercial enterprise." Lat),
Sales and Title in The Proposed Code, 16 LAxw & Co-TEmP. PROB. 3, 19 n.78 (1951).
19541
